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Abstract of
THE IMPACT OF CONFLICTING USES OF THE COASTAL ZONE
ON NAVAL PLANNING AND POLICY
A brief review of the origin of the Navy's coastal real
estate holdings and a method of approach to analysis of the
present conflicts of multiple use of the coastal zone is
used to assess the needs for continued use of these holdings
and provide valid arguments for retention of those that are
required. The study also presents a method of analysis that
could provide a means for anticipating or resolving conflict-
ing uses of Navy held real estate. The pressure created by
an increasing population combined with a reduction of the
armed forces necessitates a review of all Navy coastal zone
property holdings. The overall holdings are reviewed, how-
ever no specific areas are analyzed. The author concludes
that there are valid needs of naval coastal zone land hold-
ings to meet peacetime security requirements, to permit
expansion for fUture national emergencies, to provide flex-
ibility of response to contingencies short of war, and to
accommodate changes in technology. Conflict matrix analysis
is recommended for use in recognizing potential conflicts
and in resolving those conflicts in a rational manner.
ii
PREFACE
Purpose. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the
impact of conflicting uses of the coastal zone on naval
planning and policy in order to provide a re-evaluation of
naval land holdings and possible valid arguments and justi-
fications for naval use of the coastal zone for those hold-
ings that are regarded as essential. The first part of this
paper deals with the historical development of naval facili-
ties in the coastal zone in order to demonstrate the origin
of some of the current conflicts of coastal zone usage. The
middle section deals with the conflicts and their possible
resolution. The final section draws together the arguments
and justifications that could aid naval planners and policy
makers in resolving some of the coastal zone conflicts and
points to doctrine that should be established and promulgated
to the naval base commanders.
Sources. Approximately one third of the sources were
written by committees or commissions on the coastal zone.
Another third are private or university reports on partic-
ular areas of conflict or specific localities. The remainder
are historical in nature and concern the development or con-
siderations for the early development of our presently held
naval facilities.
iii
There is little written on the specific naval aspects
of this paper. Most naval planning and policy concerns it-
self with more classical factors such as number and type of
activities required to support a typical naval station or
technical school.
iv
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
There is a growing awareness throughout the United
States of the importance of the coastal zone to the future
of the country. All but one of the thirteen largest cities
of this nation are located in the coastal zone. For the
purpose of this paper the coastal zone is considered as
including seaward, the territorial sea of the United States
and landward, the tidal waters of the landward side of the
low water mark along the coast, port and harbor facilities,
marine recreation areas, the Great Lakes and industrial and
commercial sites dependent upon the sea.
The quantity and quality of the coastal zone are gener-
ally known and limited. Little more of it can be found or
produced, while the population of the United States continues
to increase. The consequence is to place additional demands
on residential, recreational, commercial and industrial uses
of the coastal zone. These demands create conflicts not
only among themselves for the fixed quantity of space, but
also conflict with government uses. The pressures indicated
give rise to the questioning of the old values and priorities.
This is underscored by a new awareness and concern for the
environment as evidenced by a profusion of local, state,
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federal, and private studies of the conflicts and multiple
uses of the coastal zone.
The Federal Government in general, the Department of
Defense and the United States Navy in particular, are deeply
involved in coastal zone activities involving multiple uses
of this limited natural resource. The fact of possession
alone places the Navy in conflict with private and public
interests over uses of the zone.
In the past, considerations for the establishment or
location of naval facilities included the needs of national
security and various business oriented factors, i.e., avail-
ability of skilled labor, material markets, transportation,
power sources, etc. Little, if any, consideration was given
to the impact of the conflicting or competing uses of the
land and water areas that such siting would involve. As many
of our present naval facilities were established many years
ago when our nation was considerably smaller, this impact was
not particularly significant. Today these conflicts are of
much greater concern and they must be taken into considera-
tion by the Navy and the commanding officers of naval facili-
ties.
The effects of these conflicts, their analysis and
resolution must become a part of naval policy and planning
for base development. The kinds of conflict have increased
as the result of a variety of factors such as the growth,
2
mobility and affluence of our population; leisure time
available to the average citizen; improved health along with
its concomitant increases in life expectancy; increased port
facility requirements to accommodate foreign trade and inter-
national commerce; and a vastly improved technology.
The Navy must be prepared to justify its need for the
coastal zone property it now possesses or will require in
the future. It cannot simply fall back on a broad policy
that the coastal zone holdings are required for national
defense or some obscure future development. The arguments
and justifications where warranted are derived from a study
of the conflicting uses of the coastal zone vis-a-vis the
requirements of the Navy as a part of the national defense
establishment of the United States.
The following chapters trace the general development of
our naval fac1lities and the considerations involved in their
founding. The historic review is an attempt to demonstrate
the origins of some of the present conflicts and the lessons
to be learned therefrom. A method of analysis of the current
conflicts will be introduced that can be helpful in develop-
ing arguments and justifications for policy and planning
considerations. This approach can lead to improved decisions
in those instances where property surpluses exist or where
multiple use is irreconcilable and one use or the other must
prevail. This becomes even more relevant as military bUdgets
3
are reduced and domestic considerations take on greater
importance in times of peace. The issues over naval real
estate holdings in the coastal zone will become more acute
as the U.S. withdraws from Vietnam, reduces the armed
forces, and faces up to some of the pressing domestic prob-
lems that have remained unresolved for so long. The con-
flicts generated by these long delayed programs will be
greatly felt by the United States Navy.
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CHAPTER II
THE GENESIS OF THE PROBLEM
The extent of property held by the United States Navy is
almost as great in total area as that contained in the
States of Connecticut and Rhode Island combined. As of 30
June 1969, the Navy controlled 4,176,259 acres of land with-
1
in the fifty states and the District of Columbia. Of this
total, 3.5 million acres are contained within coastal zone
states. 2,3 Tables I and II show the build-up in Navy prop-
erty holdings in certain selected, high population density
areas from 1800 to the present time. These areas were
selected for study in that they lie in or near today's highly
urbanized areas. Figure 1 shows the location of major coast-
al naval stations and facilities in relation to the urbanized
areas of today. The gross population figures indicate the
magnitude of the problem. The critical location of Navy con-
trolled property in the various port cities, as shown in
1U.S. Navy, Naval Factlities Engineering Command,
Statistical Tables of Military Real Property, NAVFAC P-3l9
(Washington: 1969), p. 2.
2 tsra., p. 6,7.
30ver 50% of this property is located in the State of
California. Although the total property holding is large, it
may be placed in better perspective by consideration of the
fact, as reported on page 61 of the 25 Feb. 1970, New York
Times that "the Southern Pacific owns 3,855,000 acres of' land
and has mineral rights on an additional 1,331,000 acres spread-
ing through the states of California, Nevada, and Utah."
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Figures 2 through 9 at the end of this chapter, gives depth
and emphasis to the impact of the problem, especially when
compared to the multitude of requirements generated by an
expanding population and a growing economy.
As is obvious from the general data included in Tables
I and II there has been a steady build-up of not only the
fleet but also of the naval shore establishment necessary to
support it. The build-up, when viewed against time, has been
spurred by the needs generated by war and the awareness of
the requirements for national defense. It is also noted
that, in general, once property in the coastal zone is ac-
quired it is seldom returned to private use. Changing
technology required the acquisition of airfields following
World War I. The land holdings required for the support of
naval aircraft has continued to grow with each new genera-
tion of aircraft. In addition the changes in technology
during World War II saw a great increase in the size of the
Navy and a consequent need for additional facilities in the
coastal zone. Although the Navy has been reduced in size
and funding between major emergencies, property acquired in
the coastal zone during the emergencies tends to remain under
Navy control. Reductions in funds between emergencies cause
facilities to be limited in operations or be placed in care-
taker statuB, but does not usually result in major changes
to property holdings in the coastal zone.
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TABLE I
NAVAL HOLDINGS IN MAJOR PORT AREAS
OF THE UNITED STATES (ACRES)
DATE OF YEAR
LOCATION ESTABLISm.ffiNT 1800 1870
PORTSMOUTH, N.H. 1800 52 157
BOSTON, MASS. 1800 23 136
NARRAGANSETI' BAY, R.I. 1869 24
1935
210
1,899
548
NEW LONDON, CONN.
NEW YORK CITY, N. Y.
FrlILADELPHIA, PA.
HAMPTON ROADS, ' VA.
CHARLESTON, S. C.
1868
1801
1800
1800
1901
86
56 183
21 1,030
83 109
113
197
1,436
2,025
2,232
KEY WEST, FLA.
PENSACOLA, FLA.
NEW ORLEANS, LA.
SAN DIEGO, CALIF.
LONG BEACH, CALIF.
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.
PUGET SOUND, WASH.
PEARL HARBOR, T.H.
1854
1828
1849
1904
1933
1854
1891
1901
3 119
2,811 2,894
214 218
3,595
2
1,760 3,232
1,212
1,585
(Above data is an estimate made from various SecUav Annualf:po~s'pStatisticalTables of Military Real PropertySe~r;s) )-319), and Fleet Guides to various ports (HO-900
8
TABLE II
NAVY PROPERTY HOLDINGS IN COASTAL ZONE STATES (ACRES)
STATE 1935{~
1969**
ALABAMA ---
5,298
ALASKA ---
112,398
CALIFORNIA 103,452
2,'792,512
CONNECTICUT 113
1,181
DELAWARE 130
626
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 640
786
FLORIDA 4,245
80,155
GEORGIA
16,694
HAWAII 28,596 66,509
LOUISIANA 218 9,08'7
MAINE 240 '7,'708
MARYLAND 2,280 23,563
MASSACHUSETTS 2,017 4,544
MISSISSIPPI 11,'787
NEW HAMPSHI RE 18
NEW JERSEY 2,265 19,551
NEVI YORK 578 9,748
NORTH CAROLINA 13 148,441
OREGON 442 62,998
PENNSYLVANIA 1,436 4,224
RHODE ISIAND 548 7,486
SOUTH CAROLINA 8,281 31,358
TEXAS 45 33,053
VIRGINIA 21,327 114,994
WASHINGTON 2,001 28,194
TOTAL 178,867 3,492,905
*
Bureau of Yards and Docks, FEDERAL REAL ESTATE UNDER
CONTROL OF NAVY DEPART!:!ENT, Washington, 19 '%7 P 4'Z5<J, • <J.
Department of the Navy, Naval Facilities Engineering
Command, STATISTICAL TABLES OF MI LI TARY REAL PROPERTY
NAVFAC P-319, Washington 1969, p. 6, 7.
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In the report of the Secretary of the Navy to the
President in 1882, the Secretary discussed the problems of
maintaining a peacetime Navy. It had been seventeen years
since the end of the Civil War. The cost of maintaining a
large naval establishment was questioned, but the Secretary
noted the feasibility of retaining all of the facilities
within the limitations of the budget by elimtnation of all
unnecessary work and dismissal of all employees not needed.
In general this peacetime procedure has been followed, sooner
or later, after every major war or emergency. It resulted
in the closure of certain navy yards and stations following
the Civil War, the Spanish-American War, and World War I.
The cold war, Korea, Suez, Lebanon, Vietnam and various "hot"
and near "hot" emergencies have delayed a major post World
War II reduction until the present time. The indications
are that the time has now arrived and cut backs have been
initiated. This is indicated by the Vietnamization of the
Southeast Asia emergency and the deep budget cuts and reduc-
tion of forces effected by the Department of Defense during
riscal year 1970.
The amount of Navy property holdings and the location of
these holdings has been previously illustrated. Numerous
commissions have indicated how these facilities came into
being and why the locations were chosen. The father of modern
naval strategy, Rear Admiral Alfred T. Mahan, gave the
10
following opinion concerning the character of a naval
station in a mid 1880 report: 4
A great navy yard has a two fold aspect.
It is on the one hand a business establishment
for carrying on certain work of a very special
kind. On the other hand it is, for the coast
and fleet dependent upon it, a base of opera-
tions in the most vital sense of the word.
The latter character, though obtaining
only in time of war, is the most important.
The tendency of a business establishment to
place itself near the materials, labor, and
sources of power which it uses--near its
resources--must, therefore, in this case, be
checked by a consideration of the military
eXigencies, and, if the two requirements can-
not be perfectly reconciled, the military
necessity must override the convenience of
business.
To Mahan the foremost requirement or criteria in deci-
sion making concerning the location of a Navy establishnlent
was the needs of national security. Business or other con-
siderations were secondary. A review of this nation's
history would lead, in this writer's opinion, to the con-
clusion that awareness of the need for security and military
preparedness becomes obscured in periods of prolonged peace.
This makes considerations of national security difficult to
envoke in peacetime land use conflicts, unless the needs can
be placed in cogent, relevant terms of the period.
4 Commission on Navy Yards and Navy Stations, Preliminary
Report of the Navy Yard Co~~ission, Washington 1917, House
of Representatives nocument No. 1946, Part I, p. 16.
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The effects of the peacetime military syndrome were
1897 The tensions were building concern-quite evident in •
ing Spanish and U.S. relationships in this hemisphere. The
Navy had been reduced to a caretaker status following the
Civil War. The shore establishment in particular had fallen
into a bad state of repair and possessed little capability
to support the fleet. This was a result of a lack of funds
in the inter-war period and a poor understanding for the
needs of a strong Navy.
A board was established in 1897 to examine the status
of the Navy's yards and docks in order to become better
prepared to cope with deteriorating Spanish-American rela-
tions. The guide lines by that board concerning the estab-
lishment of new facilities seem to codify the rules that
were then in existence and which from the beginning of U.S.
Naval history had been those governing the choice of sites
in the coastal zone. The report states: 5
Acts of Congress have repeatedly required that
navy yards and dry docks, their most essential and
costly st~lctures, shall be located with due regard
to the commercial as well as the naval interests,
and commissions have been from time to time appointed
to select such sites. The reports of these commis-
sions have furnished the board valuable information
in the discharge of its duties. In its instructions
to these commissions the Navy Department has formu-
lated the specific requirements for a navy yard to
be:
of the Navy
SecretR!~
8 , p.---r3; 14.
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1 A situation upon a good harbor of
sUfr1~1ent size, depth and accessibility for
vessels 'of the largest size and heaviest draft.
2. A favorable position with respect to
the principal lines of defense.
3. A local security from water attack due
to position and natural surroundings.
4. Ample water frontage of sufficient
depth and permanence, and with currents of
moderate rapidity.
5. A favorable position with respect to
the lines of interior communication (by rail
or otherwise) with the princlpal sources of
supply.
6. That the character of the ground shall
be suitable for the construction of excavated
docks and basins and heavy structures.
7. Proximity to centers of labor and
supplies of material.
8. Healthiness of the climate and its
suitability for outdoor labor.
9. The exis tence in the vi clni ty of an
ample supply of good potable water.
These could also serve as the requirements for a com~er-
cial seaport in the time they were written. They are con-
sistent with Mahan in that the priorities are structured to
satisfy military requirements before business interests.
Today considerable changes have occurred that would invali-
date some of the requirements of the above list; however,
the list does serve to indicate just how the current con-
flicts in Navy coastal zone holdings came into existence.
It is noted that no consideration of access to the water
13
multiple use were deemed appropriate.
climate was a consideration and, While this might perhaps
f 11 provisions forby other than Navy interests or 0 overa
Healthiness of the
be extended also to include today's concern with pollution
and environmental quality, the list obviously does not con-
sider any ecological effects of the Navy establishment.
The board did note the ever present Congressional
interest, the most important consideration involved in the
funding and siting of Federal installations. An area chosen
will experience an economic benefit and thus be of great
Congressional interest, while the disestablishment of a
naval facility will have great economic impact on an area
and arouse even higher Congressional interest.
Figures 2, 3 and 4 are mute testimony to the major
requirements indicated by the 1897 board on yards and docks.
These locations were near the major sea lines of communica-
tion that needed defending; they were well upriver out of
range of naval bombardment; the ports were heavily defended
and protected by forts that commanded either side of the
harbor entrance; there was, in the time they were built,
ample pier space and water front areas of good depth. They
were located in areas in which merchant ships of the time
were constructed, hence there was an ample supply of skilled
labor. As a result of being in or near the major ports
there was a ready supply of needed materials. The weather
14
for most months of the year, even in New England, was not
too inhospitable. As the nation grew the limited land
resources began to be filled and the problems of today
began to take form.
Another Commission on Navy Yards and Naval Stations was
appointed in 1917 by the then Secretary of the Navy,
6
Josephus Daniels. This board noted:
It might quite reasonably find some difficulty
in arriving today at the same conclusion with
respect to the location of certain navy yards and
naval stations as were reached by those in author-
ity at the time of the establishment of such yards
and stations. It must be borne in mind, however,
that conditions have greatly changed since the
majority of our navy yards and stations were estab-
lished. Extraordinary developments in size and
types of vessels and conditions affecting person-
nel and mater1al have taken place in the past ten
years, and the majority of existing yards were
established more than fifty years ago.
The same reasons that necessitated the 1897 commission
were the same ones involved twenty years later in 1917--
expanslon of naval facilities due to the needs of national
security in time of war and a changing technology; wood to
steel and the advent of the submarine. New weapons require
new support requirements ashore and at sea in the way of
testing and training facilities, exercise areas and research
facilities. The conversion from peacetime force levels to
6Commission on Navy Yards and Naval Stations, Prelimi-
nary Report on the Navy Yard Commission, Washington 191'7,
House of Representatives Document No. 1945, Part I, p. 11.
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those required for response to threats to the national
security usually involve whole orders of magnitude of
difference in numbers and types of forces. This is
7
illustrated by Secretary Daniels when he reported that:
The most difficult problems before the Navy
Department since the beginning of the war have
grown directly or indirectly out of the great
expansion of the Navy found necessary. From a
force of 4,500 officers and 68,000 enlisted men
in January 1917, the Navy has expanded to
15,000 officers and 254,000 enlisted men, includ-
ing regulars, reserves, and national naval volun-
teers. Further expansions are inevitable. The
Navy had 130 stations of all kinds on January 1,
1917. It now LPecember 19117 has 363 •••• On
January 1, 1917 there were 300 naval vessels of
all kinds in commission; today LTIecember 19177
there are many more than a thousand.
Table I shows that the major coastal zone navy yards
and stations, most of which were in existence over a hundred
years ago, are the same ones that Secretary Daniels was
addressing. There has been, is, and will continue to be
new requirements that will call for reconfiguration of the
yards and stations as technology changes the nature of
ships, their size, draft, weapon systems, and support
requirements. A reading of the annual reports of the
Secretaries of the Navy over the past century indicates
that after each national security crisis there is a reduction
7Department of the Navy, Annual Reports of the Nayr
Department for the Pis cal Year 191'7, Wash i ngt on 1918, p. 2.
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of force that naturally follows; however as each new crisis
occurs the size and nature of the Navy increases over that
of the past and consequently even larger coastal zone hold-
ings of real estate are necessitated.
Throughout its history the Navy has experienced prob-
lems in crowded harbors. There has been limited pier space
available, limited maneuvering room, and insufficient room
for expansion due to changes in technology and the world
political status. One of the lessons to be learned from a
review of the growth and change in the navies of the world
is that technology does indeed bring improvement in a
navy's capability. It also brings increasing requirements
for its support. This support requirement usually increases
the coastal zone property needs. As the Navy changed from
sail to steam the size of ships increased, sail lofts gave
way to coal storage areas, supply ships or colliers were
required for replenishment, coastal logistic bases were
required. As coal gave way to oil more fuel bases with
greater storage capacity were required. New types of support
ships were required and again space requirements in the
coastal zone increased. Technology and science produced
the airplane and it in turn was introduced into the Navy.
Again new ship types of even greater size came into being.
The need for coastal zone airfields to support operations
at sea added to real estate needs. The submar1ne brought
17
with it its own special needs for support facilities in
the coastal zone. Tactics to combat new weapons possessed
by the enemy and tactics and strategies used to best employ
our own weapons produce additional property requirements.
The Navy is now in process of converting from fOBSil
fuel to nuclear fuel. New requirements will be generated
as time passes. The need for fuel depots in the coastal
zone will eventually disappear only to be replaced by other
needs.
The Navy now possesses land holdings in all of the
major ports on the seaboard of both oceans that wash our
shores. Large segments of the population are dependent on
the employment fostered by these establishments for a live-
lihood. The yards and stations have evolved from military
necessity and such other reasons that could be classified
as political, economic, geographic, and demographic, and
national security needs. These reasons have not in reality
changed in their broad context over the years. However,
within these areas there have been some fundamental changes
in priorities that must be reconciled. There will be a
need for national security and a strong Navy to assist in
its maintenance for the foreseeable fUture.
The Navy is not only ships but also a large shore estab-
lishment, located mainly in the coastal zone, that competes
for the same space as same of the other areas of growing
18
concern to this nation. The caliber of personnel and the
training they require calls for more space ashore. These
areas of concern that are in need of national attention
have grown out of the needs of a greatly increased popula-
tion inhabiting the same area of land that provided for all
the needs of our forefathers.
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CHAPTER III
THE PROBLEM TODAY
In the preceding chapter the factors that lead to the
choice of location of our naval facilities were discussed.
These facilities were established on a set of principles
that were based on the valid needs of the time. ~any of
these remain valid today. Most of these facilities, as
indicated in Table I, and the land on which they are located
were acquired over seventy years ago. The population at
that time was less than forty-two percent of what it is
today. This becomes of even more critical impact when
growth of population in the port cities is considered.
The growth in population has seen the ~~ange from an
agriculturally oriented nation to a highly industri~ized
and urbanized nation. Figure 1 underscores this pattern
of urbanization and is indicative of the growth pattern to
be expected in the future. Forecasts suggest that by the
year 2000, seventy percent of our population will live
within fifty miles of the coastal zone. 1 The fact that
practically all of our naval facilities are located in the
highly urbanized areas, as indicated by Figure 1, is cause
1Herman E. Sheets, ''I'he FUture of Ocean Pro cr-ama "
Unpublished paper, Department of Ocean Enginee~in'g, Uni versi ty
of F~ode Island: 1970, p. 23.
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enough for a reappraisal of the real estate holdings of the
Navy in these critical areas.
This increase in population and its tendency to coastal
zone urbanization gives rise to new considerations and
priorities for land use, especially in the coastal zone.
The needs for additional real estate and access to coastal
zone waters for recreational use is increasing. Technology
is developing new areas to be exploited and new industries
to exploit the resources of the sea and the coastal zone
waters. The expanding population generates a requirement
for more housing and places of employment. This increases
the need for additional real estate. Space in urbanized
areas has always been a problem, not only to public or pri-
vate interests but also to naval interests.
The location of naval facilities and the conflicts that
have existed with naval vis-a-vis other uses and possible
solutions have been of concern to the Navy s1nce its incep-
tion. Secretary of the Navy Robeson, in his annual report
to the President in 1869, commented on the problem as
follows: 2
The location of the navy yard at Brooklyn
New York is unfortunate. The waterfront avaii-
able is quite limited, the ~allabout Channel is
2 Department of the Navy, ~29rt pf the Secretary of the
Navy, Showing the Operations of the .L'epartment for the Year
1869, Washington 1869, p. 73.
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narrow and subject to extraordinary deposits of
dirt and washings in by sewers, so as to render
the continual use of dredging machines necessary,
at a large annual cost, in order to maintain a
required depth of water. At this important
station, in the harbor of the commercial metrop-
olis of the nation, there are always numb~rs of
vessels of war necessarily crowded together and
exposed to imminent dangers from fire, the yard
being adjacent to buildings of various characters,
among the number a large gas house.
The fact that a very large tract of land has
its natural drainage through the yard, the right
of way for this drainage reserved for the city,
and the formation of the surrounding land such as
to render it impossible, except at enormous
expense, to discharge the contents of the public
sewers outside the limits of the yard, is now a
grave injury. Vessels newly coppered, lying near
the discharge of these sewers, require almost
entire recoppering in a few months, caused by the
action of the acids from manufacturlng establish-
ments, and other chemical agents.
Under all the circumstances it would seem
judicious to have a careful examination made of
the adjacent waters, to ascertain if some other
site cannot be found more suitable for the pur-
poses of the Navy. The present site is valuable
for city purposes, and it is believed that the
proceeds of its sale would be quite sufficient
to defray the expense attending the establishment
of a new yard with capacity commensurate to the
prospective wants of the country.3
Secretary Robeson recognized the problem of urban cr"owd-
ing in a busy port and the impact of other coastal zone
:;
The pollution problem was not resolved until 1884 when
the Navy funded and constructed a sewer system. It is also
noted that the yard remained in naval service until almost
a century later when it was turned over to the city of
New York.
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activities on the Navy. He also suggested the
sale of
government property and the application of ilia
proceeds of
sale to the acquisition of new facilities in a
less impacted
area of ilie coastal zone. Some of the problems of
suCh sale
were addressed by his successor a few years later, Secretary
4
Chandler, who noted in his 1882 report:
It is clear that these eight navy-yards,
involving so large an investment of original
capital and such extravagant expenditures for
maintaining them and doing work therein, will
not be required by any present or prospective
wants of the country. Whether we are to main-
tain an obsolete wooden navy or construct new
modern iron or steel warships, no such number
and extent of navy-yards will be needed. No
advocate of a stronger or better navy urges the
construction of many ships or the maintenance
of a large fleet. Upon any view, the magnitude
of our present navy-yards is grossly out of
proportion to the use to be made of them under
any system of construction and repair of vessels
or with any naval fleet likely to be built and
maintained.
The problem thus presented, what is to be
done with the navy-yards, is not easy of
immediate solution. If new iron and steel
ships are to be built or repaired in any of
them, essential changes and expensive additions
must be made. It is not probable that for this
purpose more than two or three yards need be
fitted up as complete modern naval workshops.
But it is impossible now to decide what yards
should thus be specially selected. It is also
by no means clear that every other yard will
not be wanted, if not for construction and
4Department of the Navy, Annual RetOrt of the Secretary
of the Navy for the Year 1882, Volume , WaShington 1882,
p. 11.
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repair of vessels, yet to be used as a naval
station and arsenal for war material for the
Navy. At the harbors of Boston and New York
this government should not be wtthout a pier
or landing space of its own at which its naval
vessels can touch, nor wholly dependent upon
private facilities. Any hasty discontinuance
and sale of any of our yards will result in
low prices, while if subsequent purchases of
naval stations in the same harbor become neces-
sary, the cost will be so great that the govern-
ment will find itself a large loser at the end
of the process of sale and repurchase, by each
of which land-speculators alone will have pro-
fited.
Secretary Chandler sounded a warning that needs re-
emphasis. It stems from the type of period in which his
report was made, a period of peacetime, a period that
existed from 1865 until 1898. His report was made in the
middle of a relatively stable period of American history.
His warning that the extent of property holdings in the
coastal zone, though large and not then of any urgent or
high priority alternative use, may not be best served by
their indiscriminate conversion to other private, non-mili-
tary uses. History repeatedly indicates that a reduction in
forces in peacetime will occur and that the needs for new
land to accommodate even larger forces will occur when the
next security crisis arises.
Although reductions in force levels have commenced and
the peacetime needs for real estate are less, there is an
additional factor that should be considered. After emerg-
ing from a "Fortress America" concept on entry into World
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War II a new awareness of international responsibilities
became not only apparent but necessary in the postwar era
and a "forward base" strategic concept was evolved. There
is now an undercurrent of rising nat:J.onalism running in most
of the countries in whi ch we ha ve base r1 gh t s , This "Yankee
Go Home" feeling and a desire to re-evaluate and renegotiate
has b~en exhibited in Japan, Okinawa, and the Phillipines.
In each of these areas there are large naval support facili-
ties. These facilities would require space elsewhere if
disestablished due to host nation pressure or a changing
strategic concept. Coupled with pressure by the site nation
are the problems associated with balance of payments and
gold flow that are adversely influenced by the maintenance
of overseas bases. The effects of these two pressures,
"Yankee Go Home" and balance of paymen ts, can increase the
need for Navy owned coastal real estate. Consideration for
the reservation of some property for this contingency is
merited.
Time has come full circle again and the reduction in
force and land holdings necessary to support the naval
establishment has come into focus again. The population of
this nation has a valid need for access to the sea and the
coastal zone. As previously noted most of the available
land in areas near urbanized metropolitan sections of the
nation is government owned. President Nixon addressed and
assessed the needs for additional public lands in his
message to the Congress on the environment. This message,
5delivered on 10 February 1970, read, in part, as follows:
Increasing population, increasing mobility,
increasing incomes, and increasing leisure will
all combine in the years ahead to rank recre-
ational facilities amon~ the most vital of our
public resources. Yet land suitable for such
facilities, especially near heavily populated
areas, is being swallowed up.
Plain common sense argues that we give
greater priority to acquiring now the lands
that will be so greatly needed in a few years.
Good sense also argues that the Federal Govern-
ment, itself, as the nation's largest land
holder, should address itself more imaginatively
to the question of making optimum use of its own
holdings in a recreation hungry area.
I propose full funding in fiscal 1971 of the
$326-million available through the Land and
Water Conservation Fund for additional park and
recreational facilities, with increased emphasis
on locations that can be easily reached by the
people in crowded urban areas.
I propose that we adopt a new philosophy for
the use of federally owned lands, treating them
as a precious resource--like money itself--which
should be made to serve the hignest possible pub-
lic good.
Acquiring needed recreation areas is a real
estate transaction. One third of all the land
in the United States--more than 750 million
acres--is o~ned by the Federal Government. Thou-
sands of acres in the heart of metropolitan areas
5
"Text of the President's Message to Congress Proposing
Action Against Pollution", The New York Times, 11 February
1970, p. 32:1.
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are reserved for only minimal use by Federal
installations. To supplement the regularly
appropriated funds available, nothing could be
more appropriate than to meet new real estate
needs through use of presently owned real
estate, whether by transfer, sale or conversion
to a better use.
Until now, the uses to which federally owned
properties were put has largely been determined
by who got them first. As a result countless
properties with enormous potential as recreation
areas linger on in the hands of agencies that
could just as wel1--or better--1ocate elsewhere.
Bureaucratic inertia is compounded by a
quirk of present accounting procedures, which
has the effect of imposing a budgetary penalty
on an agency that gives up one piece of property
to move to another, even if the property is sold
for ten times the cost of the new.
The time has come to make more rational use
of our enormous wealth of real property, giving
a new priority to our newly urgent concern with
public recreation--and to make more imaginative
use of properties now surplus to finance acquisi-
tion of properties now needed.
By executive order, I am directing the heads
of all Federal agencies and the Administrator of
General Services to institute a review of all
Federally owned real properties that should be
considered for other uses. The -t e s t will be
whether a particular property's continued presont
use or another use would better serve the public
interest, considering both the agency's needs and
the property's location.
Special emphasis will be placed on identify-
ing properties that could be appropriately
converted or sold, so that proceeds can be made
available to provide additional park and recre-
ation lands.
I am establishing a property review board to
review the G.S.A. reports and recommend to me
what properties should be converted or sold.
This board will consist of the Director of the
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Bureau of the Budget, the Chairman of the
Council of Economic Advisors, the Chairman of
the Council on Environmental Quality and the
Administrator of General Services, plus others
that I may designate.
I propose legislation to establish, for
the first time, a program for relocating
Federal installatlons that occupy locations
that could better be used for other purposes.
This would allow a part of the proceeds
from the sales of surplus properties to be
used for relocating such installations, thus
making more land available.
The net effect would be to increase our
capacity to add new park and recreational
facilities, by enabling us for the first time
to use surplus property sales in a coordinated
three-way program:
(a) By direct conversion from other uses
(b) Through sale of presently owned
properties and purchase of others with the
proceeds
(c) By sale of one Federal property, and
use of the proceeds to finance the relocation
and conversion costs of making another property
available for recreational use,
I propose that Federal procedures be revised to
encourage Federal agencies to make efficient use
of real property. This revision should remove
the bUdgetary penalty now imposed on agencies
relinquishing one site and moving to another.
As one example of what such a property
review can make possible, a sizable stretch of
one of California's finest beaches has long
been closed to the public because it was part
of Camp Pendleton. Last month the Defense
Department arranged to make more than a mile
of that beach available to the State of
California for use as a state park. The
remaining beach is sufficient for Camp Pendleton's
needs: thus the released stretch represents a
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shift from a low priority use to high priority
use. By carefully weighing alternative uses,
a priceless recreational resource was returned
to the people for recreational purposes.
The President's message addresses one area of conflict,
that of recreational use of our national land resources.
Elsewhere in his message he discussed another conflicting
use, pollution or uses detrimental to environmental quality.
There are other areas of use or activity that create con-
flict also demanding solution. The President noted in
particular the new pressures, population generated, and
indicated, by inference, the following to be of particular
interest to the Navy in relation to its property holdings:
(1) Federally owned lands are a precious natural
resource.
(2) A review of all federal government real estate
holdings is to be initiated.
(3) One criteria for resolution of land use conflict
was provided. This criteria weighs the Federal agency's
present use and needs and the property's location against
other uses that might better serve the public interest.
(4) Relocation of installations that fail test
criteria.
(5) Relocation expense to be defrayed by sale of
property in question to alternative user.
The President's proposals are an oversimplification of
the problem and avoid some of the implementation diffi-
culties. More definitive criteria are required. Some of
these will be discussed in the next chapter. The term
public interest as differs from national interest and
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national security needs will undoubtedly produce many
differences of opinion in the attempted resolution of
priorities of coastal zone property use. The problems of
use to be made of such federally owned property and the
prioritiesamonB various uses are more complex than ever
before.
In the past facilities have been reduced in manning,
but in general the land areas have remained within the
federal domain and have not reverted to private use. Con-
version to other uses may preclude their reuse for military
purposes in time of emergency or mark their conversion to
military use extremely expensive. It is fitting and
necessary that surplus property be returned to public and
even perhaps private use. However, the criteria for
determining which properties are surplus needs to be care-
fully formulated and take into consideration more than just
the immedia te pressures. Such cri terta must consider
future as well as present needs.
One such indication of a re-evaluation of use was given
by the President in his message. A one mile stretch of
property along the Pacific Ocean was converted from use by
the Marine Corps at Camp Pendleton and made available to
the State of California as a state park. Figure 5 shows
the Southern California area and the naval real estate hold-
ings. From the change announced by the President comes a
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possible planning approach that may be applicable to other
coastal zone areas. That concept might be termed the
"mushroom" or "Til approach.
As noted in the Camp Pendleton area there is a long
strip of ocean front property backed by a large holding
extending inland for some distance. The coastal strip is
used mainly for amphibious training exercises and other
training maneuvers associated with amphibious warfare.
Inland, various support activities require real estate for
a variety of training activities. The need for only a
limited ocean or water front exists. This permits the
realizati on of a concept that res olves a recreat :tonal
space need for the public, yet it does not unduly inter-
fere with the military need. The mushroom approach is not
applicable in all areas of naval real estate holdings in
the coastal zone. However, it is considered to be a
practical approach in those areas of applicability and
should be considered in land acquisitions of the future as
one of the planning factors.
The pressures of populat1on that require a need for
reconsideration of space requirements are not the only new
factors. In 1869 Secretary Robeson reported concern over
environmental quality, primarily because of its adverse
affect on the Navy. Today the desrading effects of pollu-
tion are of concern because of their influence on the
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quality of the environment. The Navy is deeply concerned
with various forms of pollution created by the fleet and
shore activities such as: air pollution from jet aircraft,
steam plants, firefiphting schools, and ships engineering
systems; thermal pollution from shipboard nuclear power
plants; oil pollution from ships and fuel stations; noise
from aircraft and engine overhaul activities; waste dis-
posal from ships in the harbor as well as shore activities.
These pollution and nuisance problems related to environ-
mental quality are not new, however they have acquired a
new urgency of solution.
Some of this urgency is indicated by State and Federal
attempts to consolidate and centralize control over coastal
zone affairs and environmental standards. In some states
over fifty departments, co~~issions, authorities or other
organizational structures are involved in a diffusion of
effort and purpose as they attempt exercise control over
the varied activities of the coastal zone. As a result of
the potential of the coastal zone, both economic and
aesthetic, there has been an ever increasing awareness of
the inadequacy of the highly scattered and overlapping
interests attempting to exercise control of activities in
the coastal zone. A number of coastal zone states are now
attempting to consolidate the management responsibility and
control of coastal zone resources into a more centralized
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organization. These organizations will exercise consider-
able authority when established and will be capable of
exerting increased pressure on naval use of the coastal
zone. 6 The local commander or district commander must
become more aware of these ar.encies and should indicate
his interest and initiative by seeking close liason with
appropriate coastal zone authorities as they are established.
6
For example, Daniel Wilkes, in an annex prepared to
accompany the February 1970 Report of the Governor's
Technical Committee on Narragansett Bay and the Coastal Zone
of Rhode Island, entitled "Legal Problems in 'Cons t ru ct i ve
Use of Federal-State Jurisdictional Limits" reported "Where
other areas are held by the Navy, for another instance, on
the eastern side of the Bay or on its islands, simply to
guarantee expansion opportunities in times of crises, the
Coastal Zone Authority could explore the possibility of
having the federal authority which owns them designate them
for a conservation use under the custodial care of the
Department of Natural Resources subject to terms governin~
immediate reclamation when the federal agency needs them.
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CHAPTER IV
SOME CONSIDERATIONS FOR ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM
Thus far the uses of the coastal zone have not been
specifically identified. Some of the naval uses and public
and private uses have been mentioned in passing and some of
the pressures giving urgency to the resolution of conflicts
involved between the multiple uses have been discussed.
Additionally some avenues of approach to assist in resolu-
tion of the conflicts between the various coastal zone
activities have been suggested.
To attempt to catalogue the various military and
non-military uses of the coastal zone would be a meaning-
less exercise. A review of the literature indicates the
list of coastal zone activities is as long as the in£enuity
of the author or study group. A number of studies have
been made that reduce the uses to a few broad categories
that are capable of expansion to provide any desired degree
of depth necessary for a given area of study. The Urban
Renewal Administration and Bureau of Public Roads have pro-
duced a document in which one method of describing a
standard system for identification and coding land use
1
activities is proposed. This system suggests nine broad
1Marion Clawson and Charles L. Stewart, Land Use
Information (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1965), p. 29.
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use areas, each with a one digit identifier. Each major
area is then subdivided into as many sub-areas as needed
and digitized as appropriate. A similar approach is used
2in a Navy facilities pl~~~ document. Other studies
indicate different app~chea\rnd alightly different cate-
gories of use activity. 'Ta bl e III contains a sample of the
various categories proposed.
The central factor involved in all of the various cate-
gories is that they potentially compete for the same space.
In any analysis of the various uses of coastal zone
resources, the essentiality of the activity to be accom-
plished in a specific location, or in other words its
dependency on the coastal zone for its existence, must
first be determined. Obviously certain activities can just
as well occur inland as they can in the coastal zone. For
other uses the coastal zone is absolutely essential for
their existence. In yet others the existence of an essen-
tial use promotes or requires other dependent uses. In
areas where coastal zone space is at a premium the first
decision making criteria should be essentiality or depend-
ence. Among essential uses some other criteria must be
used to determine the choice between such uses and the
priorities to be established among them.
2U• S• Navy Department, Facility Planning Pactors for
Naval Shore Activities, NAVDOCKS P-80, Washington, 1966.
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TABLE III
USES OF THE COASTAL ZONE
COSR'&. 1
Resources
Animal
Non-living
Vegetable
Repository for
Wastes
Energy (Tidal)
Enjoyment
Recreation
Aesthetics
Transportation
Sea-oriented
Land-oriented
National Defense
Land and Sea Use
Pri va te
Commercial
Industrial
Military
Other
URBA~\: RENEWAL2
Residential
Manufacturing
Transportation and
Commun i ca t i on
Utilities
Trade
Servi ce s
Cultural
Entertainment
Recreational
Resource Production
and Extraction
Undeveloped Land
and Water Areas
1IPON
Urbanization
Industry
Transportation
Mining
Waste Disposal
Pest Control
Defense
Agri cultural
Power Product ton
Water Supply
Recreation
Commercial Fishing
Research and
Education
NAVY?
Operational and
Training Facilities
Maintenance and Pro-
duction Facilities
Research Development
and Test Facilities
Supply Faclliti es
Hospital and
Medical Facilities
Administrative
Facil! ties
Housing and Community
Facil!ties
Utilities and Ground
Improvements
Real Estate
BATTELLEI
Mining and Petroleum
Marine Engineering
Recreation
Health and Welfare
Trans p ortat i on
Food and Agriculture
Defense and Space
Research and
Development
Other Industry
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ALEXANDER4
Fishing
Recreational and
Residential
Commercial Navigation
Industrial
Disposal of Sewage &
Industrial Wastes
Government and Other
Uses
TABLE III (Cont.)
RWI
Economic Development
Resource Development
Transportation and
Connnunication
Recreation
Disposal of Wastes
National Security
Defense of U.S.
Territory
Support of U.S.
Forces
Promotion of Cultural
and Social Values
Research and Develop-
ment
Preserve tion of
Natural Beauty
Enjoyment of the
Environment
Sources of data for Table III are as follows:
(1) National Council on Marine Resources and Engineering
Development. A Renort on the Seminar on Multinle Use of the
Coastal Zone. Sponsored by the Federal Interagency Com~ittee
on Multiple Use of the Coastal Zone. Williamsburg, Va.,
November 13-15 1968, p. 79.
(2) Marion Clawson and Charles L. Stewart. Land Use
Information, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1965, various
pages.
(3) U.S. Navy Dept. Facility Planning Factors for
Naval Shore Activities, NAVF~C p-SO, Wa&~ington, 19tr~
various pages.
(4) Lewis M. Alexander, Narra~ansett~at: A Marine Use
Profile, Final Report under Contrac~ Nonr-396 09), NR-389-134
Geography Branch, Office of Naval Research, June 1966, various
pages.
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Some uses are mutually exclusive, thoy pre-empt other
uses and thus are highly competitive with other uses. Com-
petitive use is not necessarily exclusive use, but implies
that some reduction, up to and including elimination, is
required in one use in order to permit an increase in another
use. In addition to being competitive, uses can also be
classified as complementary or supplementary. Complementary
uses involve those activities that support one another, that
is an increase in one activity produces an increase in
another activity. Supplementary uses include those that,
within limits, are not competitive or complementary. They
involve those activities that can be increased without an
adverse or beneficial affect on another activity. These
categories of activities that have been deemed essential of
coastal zone use could provide a weighing factor in decision
making criteria.
In reaching conclusions or making decisions on uses to
be made of the coastal zone the intra-action as well as the
interaction or externalities must be analyzed. One of the
t'irst ques tions of importance tha t needs to be considered
after essentiality is determined is that of irreversibility.
It' a use is permitted and the space it occupies cannot be
converted to other uses at a later time or the effect it has
on environmental quality is not capable of return to its
original state then the activity can be classified as
46
irreversible. Land fill of a marsh area may forever pre-
clude the use of the area as fish breeding grounds, or the
conversion of a primitive wildlife area to a recreation area
may forever eliminate its use as an area of scientific
inquiry. The erection of a petroleum processing plant may
prevent the land it occupies as well as some adjacent real
estate from being used for residential purposes for decades
to come. Prior to permittins an irreversible activity to
locate or occur in the coastal zone the degree of its
irreversibility must be carefully considered.
There are undoubtedly uses of the coastal zone by the
Navy that are irreversible. Such uses need to be clearly
identified prior to establishment of such activities at new
or future sites. Conscious decisions should be made in those
instances where a use will produce irreversible effects. Such
decisions must not be left to chance by inadvertent omission.
The effects of irreversibility should be fully explored prior
to a decision that leads to the acceptance of those effects.
,
In the last chapter the variety and number of local,
state and federal organizations interested in or involved
with coastal zone affairs was noted. The lack of coordinated
or centralized control and direction of these groups contrib-
utes to yet another problem. This problem concerns the
vagueness of goals for activities in or uses of the coastal
zone. The uses to be made of the coastal zone are not well
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defined and the goals or objectives to be achieved by such
uses are even more elusive. In some areas the choice to be
made appears to evolve from a competition between short term
economic benefit and long term social value. The diversity
of areas of concern by the existing groups in any given region
adds to the difficulty of establishing reasonable goals or
making valid use decisions.
Goals and objectives are difficult to establish with
any degree of relative permanence in the coastal zone. It
is conceivable that a centralized regional group could estab-
lish limited goals and objectives with greater ease than many
diverse groups. When suCh goals and objectives are main-
tained under review and revision, the probability of accept-
ance of activities that might be irreversible is reduced.
The ability to enforce "zoning rules" that Vlould be required
to achieve such regional goals and objectives as might be
established by a centralized authority borders on being
impossible to achieve from a political standpoint. Sub-regional
or local interests will not yield easily their present juris-
dictional authority.
Without specific goals activities may be permitted to be
undertaken that are inappropriate to coastal zone use and
that produce effects that are not only undesirable but also
irreversible. Recovery from such decisions may be forever
precluded. Regardless of the difficulty in establishing
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goals and objectives, there is a need for coordinated
coastal zone management agencies on the state or even
regional level. If such regional authorities come into
being the need for the Navy to establish appropriate liason
is readily apparent.
After considering essentiality or dependency on the
coastal zone and effects of irreversibility, the conflicts
between the multiple uses within a given geographic area
can be more specifically analyzed. The activities can be
evaluated on the basis of resource use and environmental
quality. The former is concerned with mUltiple uses of the
same space for different activities. These competing uses
could involve long term or short term space conflicts. A
fishing boat engaged in trawling in a major ship channel at
the same time a cruiser or destroyer is in the channel is a
short term conflict for example. The use of coastal land
without provision for public access to the water could be
classed as either short or long term, depending on the type
of structure erected. The erection of an oil refinery would
be a long term conflict with residential use of the same
property.
Environmental quality conflicts comprise the other area
of competing uses of the coastal zone. Environmental quality
involves not only waste disposal and other forms of pollution
effecting ecological systems but also other forms of
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environmental degradation such as aesthetic pollution and
nuisances. Undoubtedly the environment can tolerate a cer-
tain amount of pollution that is not detrimental to any
ecological system. However, the sight or odor of some
wastes are aesthetically offensive. Noise from community
recreation centers may be offensive to nearby residents.
Certain architectural designs might prove unacceptable to
some areas.
The resource and environmental quality factors involved
in various coastal zone activities require analysis in order
to make rational decisions concerning the resolution of con-
flicting uses. During a study of the Narragansett Bay,
Dr. Niels Rorholm of the University of Rhode Island developed
a matrix for use in depicting the conflicts between uses of
the area under study.3 Since its inception by Dr. Rorholm it
has not been Widely studied as an analytic tool for decision
making in the coastal zone, however, its potential is con-
sidered by this writer to be of great value in such decision
making. The conflict matrix would be a valuable tool in
identifying the conflicts eXisting between uses of the coastal
zone and also permit valid decisions to be made concerning the
3
Niels Rorholm, Economic Impact of Narragansett Bay,
University of Rhode Island, Agricultural Experiment Station,
Bulletin 374, Kingston, R.I. 1963, p. 20.
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resolution of such conflicts. A sample or representative
matrix, constructed by the author, is contained in TobIe IV.
This matrix does not pertain to a specific area.
Table IV was constructed by considering the effects of
each row activity on each column activity. The effects are
classed by resource and environmental. quality conflict as
indicated in the legend. Other construction schemes are
possible, such as digitizing conflict codes for easier visual
identification. By use of such a matrix a detailed study of
an area and the conflicts existing therein can be made to any
depth desired by increasing the activity sub-categories as
required.
From such an approach, information would be generated
that could assist in determining the most beneficial use of
the coastal zone in a specific case. This decision cannot
be made purely on economic or cost benefit analysis. There
are other areas that must also be considered such as, social,
political, and the requirements for national defense. The
basic use of such an analysis in determining the impact of
coastal zone activities on naval uses of the coastal zone
would be to provide base planners or policy makers an
insight to the conflicts involved. With a detailed knowledge
of the conflicts that exist or would exist if proposed
actions were taken, the conscious acceptance of these con-
flicts would be permitted or else provide the basis for their
impact being rendered minimal.
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The conflict matrix could not only assist in identifica-
tion and cataloging the conflicts among and within competi-
tive uses but might also assist in identifying another
fea ture that could assist in conflict resolution, commonal-
ity. The duplication of uses by various activities in a
given area may be a waste of space or financial resources.
The need to dispose of sewage or garbage or other solid
waste products may be consolidated or coordinated. If the
activities involved naval and public sectors of the economy,
there would certainly arise problems involving funding,
security, jurisdiction, management and other coordination
difficulties. These problems may be amenable to solution if
approached rationally. As the various local, state and
federal authorities involved in coastal zone affairs are
consolidated, it is anticipated that more pressure will be
exerted on naval/civil cooperation in uses that have some
measure of commonality.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS
The coastal zone of the United States is receiving ever
increasing attention at high levels of state and federal
government. The present world situation and urgent domestic
needs are calling for a re-evaluation of national prlorities
of resource allocation. The Navy is in the process of major
reductions in force, and consequently in reduction of the
shore establishment support requirements. As the need for
more land to accommodate the population and its attendant
economic, recreational, and ecological needs is recognized
the use of lands in the coastal zone by the Navy will be
questioned increasinely.
There is a minimum amount of this precious natural
resource, coastal zone space, that is required for the main-
tenance of national security. Real estate holdings not
required by the Navy should be made available through the
federal government to other valid uses. The extent of such
naval holdings can only be determined by a detailed study of
our national objectives and the strategy that is envisioned
to obtain those objectives. From su~~ a study force levels
can be determined and in turn the shore establishment
requirements in the coastal zone can be deduced. Using the
concepts of essentiality and irreversibility t~e facilitIes
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required in the coastal zone can be established. Such an
approach cannot be based solely on security and military
needs but must also take into consideration all of the
factors effecting the quality of our national life.
In a ddi tion to the minimal needs that would obtain from
such a study as indicated by the preceding paragraph, our
past history indicates t~at there are valid reasons for
reserving land holdings for at least three leeitimate future
uses. They are:
(1) To permit expansion for future national
emergenci es,
(2) To provide flexibility of response to short
of war contingencies, and
(3) To accommodate changes in technology.
There is a trend that now lends further support to
retaining land beyond that required for immediate needs.
That trend is the increasing feeling of nationalism and a
"Yankee Go Home" a tti tude among the newly emerging nations.
Our forward base strategy is being eroded and this change
must be considered when determining requirements for naval
needs of coastal zone real estate. Such consideration is
an essential part of item (2) above.
After all the military needs have been determined, the
remaining uses of the coastal zone for naval purposes
vis-a-vis other uses of the same geographic area should be
analyzed. The method of analysis recommended is that
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employing the concept of the conflict matrix. The values
to be gained from such an analysis are:
(1) The ability to predict consequences of
various courses of action through
identification of conflicts.
(2) Avoidance of costly mistakes.
(3) Preserve quality of coastal property.
(4) Permit rational choices between competing
uses.
(5) Assist in selection of response to emer-
gency situations.
(6) Assist in the maintenance of good community
relations.
In order to reduce conflicts that might arise in use of
land that is retained for legitimate future uses, another
use might be made of a conflict matrix analysis. Such an
analysis could show areas where cooperative mutual use could
prove beneficial. For example, analysis could reveal that
areas such as access to the shore line, waste disposal,
recreation sites and other mutual uses could be beneficial
to local government or public needs and yet not detrimental
to naval needs. The problems of funding, security, juris-
diction, and other mutual use management problems are capable
of solution.
For those activities not- deemed essential of accomplish-
ment in the coastal zane, suitable real estate could be
found in less urbanized or land impacted areas. A more
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detailed review of the urbanization patterns might indicate
areas that would be capable of supporting naval activity
with minimal conflict. The President has indicated that
procedures might be changed to permit the sale of property
and the monies obtained be applied directly to the purchase
of property and re-establishment of facilities at a new
location. Such a solution may be feasible, but for any
change in major activities it is not considered politically
a cceptab Le ,
The economic impact of the closure of a military base
has always been of great concern. The relocation of an
entire base is not considered to be a politically acceptable
solution, however it is considered feasible and appropriate
to relocate support facilities not requiring shore line
property to less valuable real estate in the same geographic
area. Such facilities as hospitals, cormnissaries, family
exchanges, and other anc:I.llary acti vi ties could be moved out
or away from the shore line. The "mushroom" concept is
applicable and appropriate espec:I.ally where property
exchanges can be made. Vihere such arrangements are not
feasible other arrangements could be made to accommodate
mutual use for recreational purposes.
The Navy must take the initiative in reduction of con-
flicts in coastal zone space usage and environmental quality
protection. Tocay's conflicts are mainly concerned with
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real estate space conflicts and misuse of the environment.
The needs for planning and concern with water space use
within the coastal zone and the outer limit of the continental
shelf should be the subject of further, more detailed analysis
so that proper decisions concerning its use can be made.
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